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Abstract 
During the 1ast decade, defeasib1e argumentation has proven to be a fruitful 
formalization for modelling commonsense reasorúng. In this respect, the MTDR 
framework has come to be a: fairly standard approach, because of its simplicity and 
expressive power. Recently, the framework has be,cn enriched through a number of 
dialectical considerations, resulting in a new onto10gy, based on Rescher's model of 
theory formation through dispute. 
The current trend is that dispute is the most fair and effective way to investigate 
the tenability of claims. However, dispute is usually resource-bounded, so that the 
notion of u1timately supported claims (or justifications) cannot be separated from 
this issue. This paper discusses sorne theoretical considerations for an extension of 
MTDR where bounds on resources are taken into account. 
lThis work was partially supported by the Secretaría de Ciencia y Técnica de la Univ. Nac. del Sur 
2Supported by a fellowship of the Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas (CON-
JeET), República Argentina. 
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1 I~t~oduction and mofivations 
Argumentative systems [SL92, Vre93 , SCG94]3 are formalizations of the prócess oUlefea;~ 
sible reasoning.An argument A for a claim h iB a tentative piece of reasoning 'an 'a:gent 
wquldbeinclined to accept, a11 things considered, as an explanation for h. ¡" 
. Arguments can be thought of as defeasible proofs built fromtIi.éjatent's.~kriówledge 
base. An argument A whose conclusion is h (denoted (A, h)) is a 'd~teasib1~:·próbf for 
the tenability of h. Any argument (B"j) is a defeasible proof agQ;iti~{the'-téhaJ)ility of 
(A, h) whenever accepting both (A, h) and (B, j) wOll1d lead to an Ínc·onsisteIlcy. Such 
an argument (B,j) is said to be a counterargument for (A, h). Should (B,j)' be preferred 
over (A, h) for sorne reason (e.g., specificity or because ohóme extra-logical reasons),'then 
(B, j) is called a defeater of (A, h). Since defeaters are arguments: they are alsosllbject 
to defeat by other ~rgllments. This allowslls to consider a reclirsive procedure, in\vhich 
arguments, defeater,s, defeaters of defeaters, and so on, should be taken into account. 'This 
procedure can be summarized as follows: a) arguments with no defeaters are acceptablej 
b) an argllment is acceptable only if it is has no acceptable defeaters. A claim h will be 
finally supported iff there,exist~ an acaeptable argume"!-tsupporting lL S:uch ~nBfgument 
is called a justijication for h. ,. . , 
The former process can be easily described in dialectical terms [Res.77]. The agent's 
KB represents a shared basis,4 from which two parties" proponent,and opponent, contend 
bn theacceptability of a given claim h. The burden of proof lies,~ni.tially on the proponent, 
who must advance an argument A for accepting h. The oppo:q~nt's Tole is to defeat that 
argument, by advancing another argument (B,j). Both parties perform moves, advancing 
alternatively a new argument which defeats sorne of the other party's previous arguments. 
The process, ends when no more moves can be performedj the original argument (A, h) 
advanced by the proponent is a justification if it remains undefeated when moves p,ave 
been exhausted. ' 
In A Mathematical Treatment of Defeasible Reasoning [SL92], or MTDR, a clear and 
theoretically sound framework for defeasible argumentation was introduced. That frame-
work became later enri'che<Ührough a number of dialectical considerations [SCG94], evolv-
ing into a refined, dial~~~ics-based argumentation system, which has come to be a fairly 
standard,appro:8ch because"of its simplicity and expressive powe~\. Defeasible argumenta-
. ,.¡' Ir, . . 
tion within MTDR (as wE(lI as in other argumentative systems)-'equates elegantly a pro ce-
dural and a declarati vi approach. Inference is performed by assuming unbound resou'tces 
. '. \ .;¡:.,:. \ • 
for computation',' since arguments are exhaustible. Rence, it can be shown whether any 
given claim is te> be ultim,atelyikccepted (i.e., justijied) by follo~~~g an effective procedure. 
However, recent research [Vre95, Lou92, SC95] on formal t~t>resentations of argument 
and dispute has led to the conclusion that bounds on computational resources play an 
important role in defeasible reasoning, particularly when defining protocols for interaction 
among arguments. The importance of protocols in argumentative reasoners, as well as the 
need to formalize the features of those protocols using an .expressive notation, has been 
stressed by Louiin [Lou92]. 'In"Hí~ opinion, reorientation'iii 'the KRcommurrity is needed 
to include the formal study o.fp.rptocol as a part of the &tudy of nopmonotonic reasoning . 
• , " ¡"j~ • '. :, j !: "; " 
~u 
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Dialectics refers to a form of disputation in which a serializable resource is alt~rnatively 
shared, so that one party's use of that resource is informed by the result of the other party's 
prior use of that resource. That resource has typically been time spent in the search of 
newarguments. Until now, formalizations of MTDR have not 1iaken reSOllrce bounds into 
acc:ount. 
This paper discusses sorne theoretical issues on modelling resource-bounded defeasible 
argumentation within the MTDR framework. We olltline a formal setting using multi-
language systems, which results particularIy sensible for a proper definintion of protocols 
andinteraction among parties in a dialectical debate. The paper is structured as follows. 
Section 2 presents the basic notions on multilanguage systems, or ML-systems. Section 3 
sketches a ML-system for defeasible argumentation, called MLAR. Section 4presents the 
main contributions of the paper. Sorne new definitións are introduced, and a generic algo-
rithm for charactcrizing the process of debate is dcscribed. We discuss also the notion of 
re.<Jource-bound negation and the characterization of protocols within the MLAR system. 
Finally, section 7 prcsents the most important conclusions that have becn obtained. 
2 Multilanguage systems (ML-systems) 
Multilanguage systems (ML-systems)5 allow us to structure knowledge as a set of differ-
ent theories, each of them characterized by a formallanguage. ML-systems a:tlow us to 
formalize deduction within a single theory as well as among theories using a new kind 
of inference rules called bridge rules. In these rules, formulas used in the premises and 
conclusion may belong to different languages. Bridge rules allow to derive a theorem in 
a theory from a theorem in another theory, thus allowing communication among them. 
One of thc main advantages of ML-systems is that they can be used for defilling sensible 
formalizations of the notion of context [McC80]. fi'acts and nlles can be clustered into 
subtheories, which capture the structure of a given problem, thus allowillg an easier alld 
more natural approach to developing knowledgc-base systems.6 
DEFINITION 2.1 Multilanguage system (ML). A multilanguage system (or MLS) is a 3-
uple (e, A, 'R), whose components are defined as follows: 
Languages: The set e = {LdiEl is a family of languages, where 1 denotes a set of 
indices. We will write Lí :! fol' denoting the fact that ! is a wff in Li.7 In that case, we 
will also say that ! is a Li-wff. A set of Li-wffs will be denoted Si. 
Axioms: For every Li E e we distinguish a subset of wffs ~ ~ Li , called the axioms of 
Lí' The set A ={Ai : Ai ~ Li,i E I} rcpresents the axioms of the system. 
Inference rules: 'R = {Rb~,"" Rm} is set of inference rules. Each rule R.¡ has the 
form 
5We are aware that the abbreviation 'ML' might lead to misunderstanding, since it is also used Cor 
rneta-level. 
6The rf'..ader is reCerred to IGiu91, GS94] Cor further details on multilanguage systems. 
7It must be noted that our formalizations differs partially from Giunchiglia's original defini-
t.ions [Giu91]. In particular, he writes (A, i) for dcnoting that Ais a wff in the language L¡. We did not 
use that notation sinc..e it might be confused with the one llsed Cor argument structures (see appendix). 
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where ik E 1, k = 1 ... m. Thus, the premises of a given inference rule Rt are,given as wfffs 
which may belong to di~tinct languages. The conclusion of Rt is a wff j which belongs to 
a particular language ti O -
DEFINITION 2.2 Derivability in a MLS. Let F = (e, A, R) ,bea ML-system. Let Si be a 
set of wffs in Li E e. Let r = U{ Sj }, j El, where 1 is a set of indices associated with F. 
We will say that the wff L i :! is derivable in P'}romT, written r f-F L i :!, if there exists 
a sequen ce Pl,P2, ... ,pk,such that for every Pi:'it holds th~t either(a) Pi is an itistance of 
an axiom in F, or (b) Pi E r, or (c) Pi is a consequence of previous p;'s by virtue of the 
application of sorne inference rule in R. If r = 0 and I' f-F Li:j, we will say that Li:j is 
provable in F. O 
3 The MLAR system: fundamentals 
Next we will present the main features bf MLAR, aML-system for defeasible argumen-
tation. The reader is refered to [CS96] for a complete description. The main .idea.is to 
capture the different aspects of the MTDR framework within a multilanguage system, 
This involves basically two aspects: 
1) Knowledge representat~o,~: i the ,knowleqge pase oí an intelligent agent using the 
MTDR framework will be represented through the axioms of the MLAR system, Axioms 
will correspond t~_ 9lstinguished subsets of two distinct languages LIC and La. 
2) Inference engine: the elements needed for performing defeasible inference in MTDR 
will be described in terms of different languages (Lr.-, LArbit, L pro, L opp , LDebate) , which 
allow tocapture an introspective debate among two parties (proponent and opponent). 
ruled by a third party called the arbiter. 
Subindices ineach language Li denote the intended meaning oÍ'. formulas in Lí' The 
languages LIC and Va are used fot reptesenting't'lon-defeasible aud defeasibleknowledge, 
respectively. Formulas in Lr.- will represent defeasible proofs obtained frorilLi and L't::..; 
Formulas:in LprfiJ and Lopp will stand for arguments asserted by ~he proponent ~nd the 
opponent as the debate proceeds. Formulas in L Arbit will capture the arbiter's.1mowledge 
on the debate, establishing when a defeasible proof is an argument, when an argument de-
feats another, etc. Finally, the different stagesin the debate [SC95] are capturedthrough 
formulas in LDebate. Every stage accounts for a number of arguments being undefeated 
(alive) , and a number of arguments being defeated (dead). Stages are numbered consec-
utively. We characterize defeasible inference as a proofwithin a ML-system. 
DEFIl"HT:ION 3.1 (The MLAR system) A ML-system for defeasible argumentation is de-
fined as ~ 3-uple ( {L IC , 4!:l.,Dr-', LDebate, LArbit, L pro , Lopp} , { IC, ~}, R) where lC ~ L IC , 
Y ~ ~ La, such that eyery fqrmula e E ~ is non-ground. The set 1,?. of inference rules 
characterizes the validinfereIl.ce steps that can be performed. O ' 
For space limitations, we do not present the whole set of inference rules in MLAR. As 
an example, sorne of them aTe shown in figure 1. 
From the :l~lillguages andthe inference rules specified aboye, a debate in dialectical 
terms can be conceptualized as a proof sequence within a ML-system. More formally, an 
argument (A, h) will 'be'a justification iff there exists a proof sequence SI, ••• , Sn, where 
the wff Sn denotes that (A, h) is a justification. 
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1. Definition of argument: 
Lb- :..,nonminimal (dproof (A, h) ) Ljv :..,inconsistent (dproof (A, h) ) 
LArbit:arg(A,h) 
2. Definition oC munterargument:, 
L Arbit:arg (Al, hl ) LArbit:arg (A2 ,h2) 
LArbit:subarg(arg(A,h) ,arg(A2,h2» LArbi't:disagree(arg(A,h) ,arg(A2 ,h2» 
LArbit:counterargues (arg(A1,hJ ) ,arg(A2 ,h2 » 
,; 3. Parties can advance arguments 
4. Beginning of debate 
LArbit:arg(A, h) 
Lpro:arg(A,h) 
LArbit:arg(A,h) 
Lopp:arg(A,h) 
LDebate:debate(O,arg(A, h) ,Pro, ali1Je) 
5. Definition of justification: 
LDebatc:debateCi,arg(A,h) ,Party, alive) 
LDebate:-.debate(succ(i) ,arg(A,h), Party,dead) 
LArbit:justified(arg(A,h) ) 
Figure 1: Some of the inference rules llsed in the MLAR system 
DEFINITION 3.2 (justifirnlion) Let h E LI<; U La, where LIC y La are the languages for 
knov;,ledge representation in a ML-system for defeasiblc argumentation 8=:( {LIC, La, 
L fv , LDebate, LArbit, Lpro , Lopp} , { K, L.\}, 'R). Then h will be justified iff the formuia 
jus,tified(arg(A, h)) of LArbit isprovable for sorne A, i.e., if and only if 1-8 L Arbit : 
justified(arg(A, h)). O ' 
The following exarnple shows MTDR's behavior for a sarnple KB, and how it is cap-
tured in MLAR: 
J~;XAMPLE 3.1 ,Let /(,=- { el, e2, e-e2 }, and let A=, {, el /\ C2 >-~ ~, ,e2 )-- e, el )-- el, 
e:z/\ e4 ).,--; ..,el, el )-- e4, el /\ e2 >-- ..,e4, }. Then,;I1:1 = { E!l )-- el, e2 )-- e, el 1\ C2 )-- h 
} is an arg1lffient for h. The, argumellt (Al, h) has ,¡¡tP. associated defeater (A2 , ..,el) , A2 = { 
el >-- Coi, C4/\ e2 )-- ..,e! J. Then (Al, h) is defeated, and cannot (ulti~ately) be accepted 
But this second argurnent is not acceptable either, since it has a defeater (A3 , ..,el) , A3 = { 
f;l /\ e2 > ..,ed. Henc..e (Al, h) is reinstated. There are no more arguments to take into consid-
eration. Then (A3, ..,e4) is a JuStijication (it is undefeated)j (A2, ..,e!) is not acceptable, because 
of being defeated (so it is not a justification). The original argument (Al, h) is acceptable (since 
it has no acceptable defeaters), being also a justification. 
In MLAR, the whole process is represented as a proof sequence SI, 82, ... Sn, being Sn = 
LArbit: justified(arg(At, h)). The provisional. acceptance (rejection) of an argument (A, h) 
presented by Party (proponent or opponent) would be captured by a wff Sk in that sequence 
having the forro LDebate: debat e (i,arg(A, h),Party,alive) (LDebate:debate(i,arg(A, h),Party,-
dead). The index i denotes the~urrent stage of the debate. Prqvisional acceptance (rej~ction) 
rnay result in rejcction (acceptance) in further stages of the debate (see [CS96] for g(¡ltails). 
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,4 Resource-bounded defeasible argumentation 
,in standard MTDR-basel~~proaches" the process of determi~~;'¡whetherthere exists a 
justification for a given claim h can becharacterized through an effectiire,procedure [SL92}, 
whieh can be modelled as a debate between two parties. Termination is guaranteed, having 
the same outcome independently on how the debate is performed. Inference in MLAR 
is sound and complete with respect to MTDR, i.e. (A, h) is'a justification in MTDR if 
and only if there exists a proof sequence SIl S2, .. . I Sn in M;LAI:t such that Sn = LArbit: 
justified(arg(A, h)). 
In [Lou92], Ronald Loui considers the role of bounds on computational resources with 
respect to defeasible argumentation. As he points out, rules in conflict should be re-
garded as policies, which are input s to deliberative processes. Dialectical protocols would 
be appropriate for such deliberations when resources are bounded. One of the main con-
tributions of his paper is the observation that non-monotonic reasoning can be subsumed 
in a dialectical frarp.ework, where the notion of process and non·determinism will playa 
fundamental role. 
Loui discusses a "skeletal model" for characterizing a resotitce-bounded defeasible 
reasoner. In that model, a debate is defined as'a' locution record, á finite sequence r = 
(ll,' .. , lk)' Each locution is a 3-uple (Pi I Si, ri), where Pi denotes a pany, Si is a sentence, 
and ri is a "res o urce marker". Quoting Loui: 
roo] each Pi is a party, Erom a set P oE parties (some of which are players); 
each Si is either a wff in a language L (which may actually:be better thought 
to be a set of languages, such a.s an object language and its metalanguage), 
or is a structure' meeting sorne well-Eormedness conditions, such a.s being an 
argument for a sentence in Lj and where ri is a description oE resources, such 
as a d- vector, a marker oE resources consumoo, oE d dilferent resource. ,types. 
Loui goes on by defining a number of distinguished elements in that skeletal mode!. 
The most important one is the notion of disputation protocol, ~hich consists of differ-
eut functions fo! 'making locutions, representing 10cution-~bligatioIls as well as locution-
restrictions, and determining when the debate has finishecl and ~hich 'is its outcome. This 
characterizatiqn,gives a wideo-ranging, semi-formal setting fOf'understanding resource-
bounded defe~sible argumentation and conceptualizing existing argumentative systems 
inside that setting. 
We conte~d 'P!~t the MLAR system allows a sensible formalization of LOlli 'B apptoach, 
without losing ,M:.+PR'&,.$ound theoretical background. A proo! in MLAR can be namely 
seen as a loeutio!}., r~CQJd; every locution (Pi, Si, ri) can be characteri!Zed as a sequence of 
wffs in that pr?,?t.;¡;1¡'he,~otion of context, formalized in terms of a ML-system, provides 
a generic frarrieW¡9Il:~fo:r.'defining.flexible interaction among inference rules. We want to 
extend MTDR,.'foP:lp;ut~ng justifications as the outcome of a resource-bounded process. 
A debate can be thought of as a resource-bounded process for determining the accept-
ability of a claim h, whose outcome is a set of logical propositions. That set would be 
called current opinion.8 The:basic algorithm for a debate process could resemble the one 
shown in figure 2. First, a party Pi' must be chosen to perform a move?'ni. That move 
8This term was introdücooiil Loui"s skeletal model [Lou92], although in a different sense. We use this 
term following Vreeswijk [Vre95]. 
621 
3er. WoilcshoP sobre Aspectos Teóricos de la Inteligencia Artificial 
will consume ri computational resources from party Pi, and change the current opinion.9 
The dcb~te wOl;l.ld be c.anried on until eithcr the original claim h is established (justified)10 
or resources are exhausted. In the latter case, both expenditure of resources and current 
opinion would bea measure for the "justification degree" of the claim. Next we will 
introduce some definitions, which can be helpful by'providing a more formal insight: 
Algorithm: Debate_process 
INPUT: Claim h 
OUTPUT: Current..opinion 
Repeat 
Select party Pi to perform next move mi. 
Performing move mt consumes ri resources, 
and changes current opinion. 
Untll (h is establisheá) or (resources exhausted) 
Figure 2: The basic algorithm for performing a resource-bounded debate 
DEFINITlON 4.1 (debate) A debate d is a finite sequence of moves, d =..: {m1, m2, ... ,mk}. 
A debate is exhaustive is no further moves are allowed after move rnk has been carried 
out. O 
Clcarly, in standard MTDR aH exhaustive debates lead to the same outcome (even 
though sorne of them can be preferred over others, as we will see next). However, when 
resources are bounded, exhaustive debates may differ, since expenditure of resources is 
also an input to the deliberative process. Next we will state Loui's notion of mOve within 
MLAR: 
DEFINITION 4.2 (move) Let 8=(1:" A, 'R) be a MLAR system. A move mi is a 3-uple 
(Pi, Si, ri), where 
[] 
• Pi denotes a party. There are three possible parties which may perform moves: 
propop,ent, opponent, and arbiter. 
• Ji denotes a wff tha t can be inferred from wffs in previous moves m1, ... ,mi-l using 
the inferen(;e rules in 'R, i.c·{fl' ... ,fi-df-sfi. 
• ri denotes,t;hc computational resources consumcd by Pi for inferring fi. 
gX~MPLE .4~;1 Consider example 3.1. A first move m1 could result in ( Pro, LDebate: 
debateCl,arg(A¡,h),Pro,alive,), nl) (nI denotes resource units spent in performing 
the move)Y A second move m2 could on its turn result in ( Pro, LDebate: debate(2, 
arg(A2, ,CI), Opp, alive, ), n2 ). The arbiter could have the burden of acting after propo-
nent and opponent have advanced arguments. In that case, its move could be determining 
that the second argument defeats the first, so that the first argument is reinstated as dead: 
( Arbit, '-'Debate: debate (3,arg(A}, h), Pro, dead, ), n3 ). 
9 Assuming oí course that there are at least ri resource units available for Pi 
lOFollowing the literature, the terms established, ju.stified, and warranted can be used interchangeably, 
llulessstated otherwise. 
11 We can assume that all moves have uniform costo Resource units can be !X>nceptual~zed as 'weights' 
assigned to inference rulcs. 
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Current o.pinio.n deno.tes the set o.f aH lo.gical pro.po.sitio.ns in LDebate derived so. far, 
representing the current o.utco.me o.f the debate process. In the example 4.1, current 
o.pinio.n is that (A2,.fT\Cl) pre.yails¡ whereas, (Al, h) is rejected. 
DEFINITION 4.3 (curre.nt opinion). Letd,= {ml,m2,.· .. ,mk}be.,a debate,where·every 
move mi has the fo.rm (Pi, 1i, ri), as defined abo.ve. The c'U:rrent opinion o.f the debate d, 
deno.ted CO( d), is the set, {JI, 12, ... ,Jk}' O 
Established (o.r justified) o.pinio.n deno.tes the set o.f a11 lo.gical pro.po.sitio.ns in LDebate 
derived so. far, such that they will prevail up to. the end o.f the debate pro.cess. Established 
wffs acco.unt fo.r argumeIits thát canno.t be defeated infurther stageso.f the debate, i.e., 
they are justificatio.ns. 
: ~. . " • : • ji· : ',: 1 • " , • : 
DE'fINITION 4.4 (estab(is~ed opinion): Let. d -:- {mh m2, . .. , mk} be a debate, and let 
CO( d) be its asso.ciated current o.pinión. ~Th~: esta,bli'shed opinion¡~f the debate d, deno.ted 
EO(d), is the set o.f a11 established wffsin d. A-~ff Ji E dO(df(derived in mo.ve mi) is 
said to. be established íff ,Ji (derived in .'móve mj, j >i)do.es no.t' belo.ng to. CO(d). O 
In the example 3.1, (A2 , ,CI) is no.t'est'ablished, since carrying o.n the debate pro.ces,? . 
\ . .' . . 
it will resúlt defeated. '
In stanq?;rd MTDR, given a kno.wledge base (IC, ~), .. a11. exhaustive~.~pate~ th~t fan 
be perfo.rme,Q. have the same lenght, and the established o.piruo.n will be 'al.~ays the same, 
Can we have so.me kind o.fpn~fer~n,?~ amo.ng different exhaustive4~bates? betermi~t~i a:~. 
so.o.n as po.,ssible whether the o.rigirial claim is justified might pro.vide a preference crjterio.n: 
DEFINITI()~. 4~5 (Preference among debates). Let di, dj be two. exhaustiy-e debat~~ abo.ut 
a gi ven cli:l.im h. The debaty, di is said to. be preferred over dj iff 1) There e~sts an a.rgum~~t 
(A,'h,) sucl], Ülat the wff ju~tified(A .h) can be established in debate di !in ki mo.ves, and' 
2) For evefy argumeIit;(i::i,'h}, such that the wff jus{ified(B.h) can be established in 
debate dj inkj mo.ves, i~~o.lds that kj >= ki . 0;(; ¡' 
Bo.und~o.n reso.urcesjmpo.se mo.ve Testrictio.ns. So.me pro1;9co.ls may be acceptable to 
reach the "right"outcome, and o.thers may no.t. The po.int is whether we can define so.me 
desiderata to. be satisfied by pro.to.co.ls with respect to. the final o.utco.ffie' [Lo.u92]. This 
pro.mpts the fo.llo.wing questio.n: Can the "co.rrectness" al the autcame be ensured by the 
"co.rrectness" 0.1 the Prot9.C9J? 
As we have seen, even tho.ugh terminatio.n can be guaranteed, there still exists pref-
eren ce amo.ng exhaustive deqates (that is why impro.ving the search strategy in MTDR 
makes sense). When reso.urc~s are bo.und, impro.ving the search strategy is essential fo.r 
goo.d argumentatio.n. This can be: o.bserved in co.11o.quial argument [Vre95] carried o.ut in 
deliberative organs: there are time co.nstraints fo.r speaking, and it is po.ssible to. raisé 
"po.ints of arder" fo.r steering the debate. 
5 Resource-bound .negation ',1:' 
... ~ o": '! ... .i ¡ 
Neg~ti9;n;.}¡la.f;ilpng,,~ti!P~rv~d a deep analysis in kno.wledge representatio.~and, no.n-mo.n:, 
o.to.ci~.,r~,~QllÍngJ'" ~qlÍdecibility o.f first-o.rder languages led to. define the interrelat~p.r 
notio.ns o.f GlOS~fWprld assumption (CWA) and negatíon as failur.e. (NAF).TJ:I.~ latter., 
turned o.uhto., b~~~pec;:jally. rel~vant within the lo.gic pro.gramming Co.IDII:1lfni.ty. Acco.rding:. 
to. R. Lo.ui [Lo.u92], NAF can be embedded in a reso.urce-bo.unded setting. A.s an example, 
he cdrlsiders:the'cas;e'ófthe two. co.nfliCting default rules [Rei80], assuming' "time fo.r pro.o.f" 
as the o.niy'resó'Urce:'" ,." 
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A:B 
B 
Given A, by applying the leftrule we can show B, since we are not able to proof -,B (i.e., 
it is consistent to assumcB). By trying to prove-,B and failing, after having consumed a11 
resources on the attempted proof. The opposing rule would not be consideted. Loui refines 
then the former rules as defeasible rules, which would allow a more sensible treatment of 
resources in a debate between. proponent and opponent. 
(1) A is a reason for B (2) A is a reason for -,B 
Given A, the proponent advances (1) as an argumenl for Bi if time remains, the opponent 
tries to resol ve thc dispute in its favor, by advancing (2). Loui observes that /Ir ... ] tbe 
N AF example illustrates how NMR, in its early forms, ignores dialeetical ide8J3, resource 
distribution, and thc cOllsideration of fairness under resouree-bounded construetion tbat 
lead to dialecti(',al ideas.". Finally, he adds /lTbe fairer the protocol of a disputation, and 
t;he better the strategic play, and tbe inore eO'eetive the expenditure of resourre, tbe better 
warrallted the outeome. " 
Traditionallogic programming has also been enriched by relating together negation-as-
failure and classic negation. This results in so-called extended programs [GL90], based on 
the method of stable models. Extended programs inelude clauses of the form -,Q +- notP, 
which stands for "if there is no evidence that P is true, then Q is false". Extended 
programs are connected with the problem of relation between logic programming and 
nonmonotonic formalism,' As the authors point out in [GL90], "[ ... ] We can say that 
the elass of extended programs is the place where logic programming meets defaul~ logjc 
halfway." 
We believe that an MLS-based formalism as the one presented in this paper a110ws us 
to nicely combine Loui's ideas with negation in extended logic programs, resulting in a 
sort of "resource-boundednegation". Consider, for example, the following inference rule 
of the MLAR f!ystem: 
LDebGte:debate (i, arg(A ,h) , Party, alive) 
LDcbate:-,debate(succU) ,arg(A,h) ,Party,dead) 
LArbit:justified(arg(A,h) ) 
This rule states that we can conelude that the argument (A, h) is a jl,l.stification only if 
(A, h) has been established by Party (propouent) at stage i of the debate, and it is not 
possible to show that (A, h) would be defeatcd at stage i+ 1. The last statement should be 
understood under CWA, since there exists an effective procedure for demostrating whether 
debate(succ(i) ,arg(A,h) ,Party,dead) holds. 
However, proving this sentenee favors the opponent's positionj it should not be in 
charge of the proponent to spend resources (time, memory, etc.) tu. prove it. We could 
therefore distinguish two kinds of resources: a) proponep.t's time for proof, and b) op-
ponent's time for proof. Whenever the justifiC'.ation process is carried out, proving a 
sentence P should be considered as expenditure of a proponent's (opponent's) time when-
ever P supports (undermines) the proponent's (opponent's) position. In that case, proving 
debate (suce (i) , arg(A, h) , Party, dead) should be in charge of the opponent. 12 
12Thti relation between extended logic programa alld defcasible argumentation was already introduced 
in [SG95}. HoweVer, that approaCh has a different motivation¡ assignment of resources is not cOIlBidered. 
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6 Protocols and resource bounds 
A protocol is a kind of 2-party prbcedure which encod~,dialectical information [Vre95]. 
When computing justifications, many alternative protocols might be followed. Sorne pro-
tocols allow parties tQconstruct many arguments at'a time; others don't; sorne protocols 
set the burden of the proof always on the proponent, others on both proponentand op-
ponentj and so on. The study of protocols in defeasible argumentation is relatively new; 
relevant work on thifi'Subject can be found in [Vre95, 'Lou92]. '. 
Fairness and effectiveness are basic properties demanded on protocols. Fairness de-
mands maximal opportunity for response: a protocol is fair ·whenever any daim estab-
lished in dispute is actually justified. Effectivenes demands maximal information about 
the goal to reach when performing inference: a protocol. is effective whenever any justified 
claim can be established in dispute (see [Vre95,.Lou92] for a detailed treatment ,pf the 
subject) . 
. Protocols cani be definedwithin an MLAR system through inference rules which specify 
how parties 'ii1teract along thecourse of.the debate. Forexample, fbr an alternating order 
Pro-Opp-Arbiter, as suggested in section 4, the following three rules weuld suffice: 
LArbit:nexLplayer( arbit) 
LArbit:next_player(pro) 
LArbit:next_player(pro) 
L Arbit:next_player( opp) 
L Arbit :next_player( opp ) 
LArbit :nexLplayer(.a,rbit) 
It can be the case .. .that expenditure of.resources or current opinion (i.e., the proof 
sequence derived so far) affect the protocol itself. Consider for example the case that 
we want to allow proponent to :attack twice .whenever a certain situation 'Y holds (that 
situation can be captured·through a wff in MLAR). In order to do this, an inference rule 
as the ·following could be introduced: 
LArbit:next_player(pro) 1\ "f 
L Arbit:next_player(pro) 
.' 7 ', 'Conclusions and futurework 
In this paper,wehave discussed several issues concerning resource-bounded defeasible· 
argumentation, many of which represent problems still open in computational dialectics. 
We have also shown that a multilanguage system for defeasible argumentation such"'as 
MLAR can be properly extended for dealing with theoretical issues concerning bounds'on 
~ .! ; :' ; 
resources. 
It is clear that there exists a tradeoff between desirable math'ematical propetties 
qt [SL92] (such asthe existence of an effective 'procedure for computing justific~tio:p.s) 
~hd ~ non-demostr~tive, resource-bounded approach (which might be more adequa:tefor 
~~lvi~g reai~world problems through defeasible argumentation). Figure 3 sketches ~ome 
of the main distinctive features between standardand resource-bounded MTDR. 
:Itis still debátable to what extent we should include non-determinism within an ar-
g\uilentative systén as an input that affects the final outcome of a: deliberative process. 
It snould be ob~erved that recent research [Che94] has demostrated that protocol issues 
~re relevant evenwhen considering no bounds on resources, leading to important com-
putational savings. Notions such as commitment store and burden of proof deserve as 
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Standard MTDR 
• Any protocol is both fair and effective. 
• AH exhaustive debates are equal. 
• The current outcome of the process 
varies; thc final outcome is always the 
sarue. 
Resource-bounded MTDR 
• Effectiveness and fairness depend on 
protocol definitions. 
• Exhaustivc debates may be different. 
• Both current and final outcorne of the 
process may vary. 
Figure 3: Standard and resource-bounded MTDR: a comparison 
well a more formal treatment in order to fuUy iuoorporate them in existing argumentative 
systems. 
Even though computational dialectics is a relatively new field, much cffort has been 
already spent in studying complex issues such as self-modifying protocols, rule forma-
tion, and preference criteria among arguments [Vre95], sometimes semi-formally. In our 
opinion, a llnified formal setting as the one outlincd in this paper provides the necessary 
theoretical background fOl" studying several properties and features desirable in actual 
argumentative systems. 
A The MTDR framework 
We will briefly introduce the main concepts and definitions of the MTDR framework (see [SL92, 
SCG94] for further details). 
Knowledge representation: The knowlédge of an intelligent agent A will be represented 
using a first-order language L, plu..c:; a binary meta-linguistic relation ">-" bet.ween sets of 
non-ground literals of L which share variables. The members of this mela-linguistic relation 
wíll be called defeasíble rules, and they have the form "a >- f3 ". The relation ">-" is 
lluderstood as expressing that "reasons to believe in the antecedent a provide reasons to believe 
in the conscquent f3". Let K be a consistent subset of sentences of the language L. This set 
c;an be partitioned in two subsets Ka, of general (necessary) knowledge, and Kp, of particular 
(contingent) knowledge. The beliefs of A are represented by a pror (JC, .6.), called .Defeasible 
Logíc 8tructure, where .6. is a finite set of defeasible rule,s. K represents the non-defeasible part 
01' A's knowledge and .6. represents information that A is preparf'.d to take at lt',ss than face 
value. 1:!1 denotes the set of al! ground instances of members of .6.. 
Inference 
DEl<'INITION A.l Let r be a subset of K U 1:1. A ground literal h is a defea.~íble consequence of 
r, abbreviated r r.- h, if and only if there exists a finite sequence BI, ... , Bn such that Bn = h 
and, for 1 ~ í < n, eithcr Bi E r, or Bi is a direct consequence of the preceding elements in the 
snquence by virtue of the application of any inference rule of the first-order theory associated 
with the language L. The ground instances oí the defeasible rules are regarded as material 
implications for the application of inference rules. We will a180 write K U A r- h distinguishing 
the set A of defeasible rules used in the derivation from the context JC. O 
DEFINITlON A.2 Given a context 1<.:, a set .6. of defeasible rules, and a ground literal h in the 
language L, we say that a subset A of 1:!1 is' an argument .'!Jtructure for h in the context K 
(denoted by (A,h}K' or just (A,h)) if and only if: 1) K U A r- h, 2) K U A V-.L and 3) 
)JA' e A, K U A' r- h. Given an argument structure (A, h), we also say that A is an argument 
for h. A subargument of (A, h) is an argument (8, j) such that 8 ~ A. o 
626 
3er. Workshop sobre Aspectos Teóricos de la Inteligencia Artificial 
-..,,; ~':':, '~:!.~' ! ~ (, . 
DEFINITION A.3 Two argument structures (Al. hl ) and (A2• h2) disagree, denoted (Al, h I ) txJ 
,!(A2 i hÚ, if'and only'iflCU {h1j'h2} r- -L. O 
DEFINITION A.4 Given two arguments (Al, h l ) and (A2, h2), we saythat (Al, h l ) counterargues 
h (A2, h2),denoted (Al, h l )®-+ (A2, h2) iff 1) There existsasubargument(A,h) 'of (A2, h2) 'such 
that (Al,hl:~t$c:j {A,h);2} For every proper subargutn'erit (S,j) of (AI,hl ), it Ís nbt the case that 
(A2, h2)~ (8, J). b . 
DEFINITION A.5 Giv~n two argument structures (Al, h I ) and (A2, h2), we say that (Ah hI) 
defeats (A2,h2) at literal h, deJ;lPted (A.hh-l) »def(A.2,hÚ,.if .a.pdonly if there exists a sub-
argument (A, h) of (A2 , h2) such that: (Al, h I ) qmnterargues (A2, hÚ atthe literal h and 1) 
(Al, hl ) is;~trictly m~~e:~pecific13 than (A, h),or 2) (Ai; h1))s unrelated by ~p~cificity to (A, h). 
If (Al,h1) »def(A2,h2); we will also say that(Al,h l ) is a dejeaterfor (A2,h2). o 
We will acc~pt a~'argumen:t A ~ a def~~sible .. reaSon for ~'conclusiqn h.if A is a}ustifi~~tíon 
for h. The acceptance of the original argument A as a justification' for h will result from a 
recursive' procedure',' in VI hich' arguments, co.unterarguments; counter-countera~guments, and so 
on, should be taken into account. This leads"to a tree structme, called díalectical tree. Paths 
along' that tree'will becalled aryumentation lines~' which can be thought cifalternatésequences 
of supporting and ínterfering arguments in a debate.' . ,", 
DEFINITION' A.6 Let (A, h) be aharguinent'·5tructure. A dialectíeal tree for·(A, h), denoted 
1(A, h), is recursively defined as follows: . 
.1. A single node contaiIÚng al}. argumel)t structure (A,h) witb no defeaters· .is,by itselLa 
dialectical tree for (A, h). ! 
2. Suppose that (A, h) is an argument structure with defeaters (Al, h1 ),(A2, h2) ..... ,(An,,~). 
We construct the diale~,t.ical tree foi" (A, fi), 1(A, h), by putting (4, h) in the mqt node of it 
and by making this' nod~ the parent no'de of the roots of the aC:ceptable dialectical trees 
of '(A:i, h¡},(A2 , hÚ, ... , '(An,hn). . ::, 
" " ,',,', ", 
o 
DEFI~ITION A.7 Let 1(A, h) be a dialectical tree for (A, h). Nodes in 1(", h) can b~recurs~y~ly 
l~beled ~'l.f.ndejeated nodes' (U-qódes) and deféated nodes (D-nodes) as follows:.á),',Leaves in 
1(A,h) are U-nodes; b) Let (B,q)be an inner n~de in TiA,h)' Then (B,q) will be"aU-node iff 
every ch,ild node of (B, q) is a D-node. (B, q) will be a D-node iff it has at least 0I;le U-node ~ 
a child node. O ,,'
DEf'INlTION A.S Let (A,h) be an argument structure, and let 1(A, h) be its associated dialecti<;~ 
tree. 14 We will say that A is a justíficatíon for h (or (A, h) is a justification) iff the root node 
Of,1j,A, h) is.a U-node. O 
"" . j' , 
13Specificity imposes a partial order on argument structures, being used as a preference criterion among 
them [SCG94]. However, other preference criteria could also be valido 
14 Actually, dialectical trees should satisfy a number of constraints for being considered acceptable 
dialectical trees (see [SCG94]). That issue, however, exceeds the scope of this paper. 
627 '\ . 
3er.· Workshóp"" sobre Aspectos Teóricos de la lnt"eligenéia Artificial 
References 
[Che94] Carlos l. Chesñevar. Stratifying defeasible rules in argumentative reasoning: a oonsistency-based 
approach. En Primer Work..'Ihop Argentino sobre Aspectos Teóricos en Inteligencia Artificial 
[CS96] 
[Giu91] 
[GL90] 
[GS94] 
[Lou92] 
(Buenos Aires), Abril 1994. . . 
Carlos Iván· Chesñevar y Guillermo R. Simari. Un sistema multilenguaje para argumentación 
rebatible. Reporte Técnico, Grupo de Investigación en Inteligencia Artificial (GIlA), Universidad 
Nacional del Sur, Bah a Blanca, Argentina. (Submitted to the Segundo Congreso Argentino de 
Ciencias de la Computación), San Luis, Argentina, Noviembre 1996. 
Fausto Giunchiglia. Multilanguage systems. En Proceedings of the AAAI Spring Symposium 
on Logical Formalizations of Commonsense reasoning, 1991. 
Mlchael Gelfond y V1adimir Lifschitz. Logic programs with classical negation. En Proceedings 
of the 7th International Conference on Logic Programming. Jerusalem., Junio 1990. 
Fausto Giunchiglia y Luciano Serafini. Multilanguage hierarchical logics (or:how we can do 
without modallogics). Artificial Intelligence, (65):29--70,1994. 
Ronald P. Loui. Process and policy: resource,.bollnded, non-demonstrative argumento Compu-
tational Tntelligence (to appear), Octubre 1992. 
[McC80] John McCarthy. Circumscription - A Forro of Non-rnonotonic Reasoning. Artificial Intelligence, 
13:27-39,171-172,1980. 
[Rei80] Rayrnond Reiter. A Logic for Default Reasoning. Artificiallntelligence, 13(1,2):81-132, Apr 
1980. 
[H.es77] Nicholas Rescher. Dialectics, a Controversy-Orienled Approach to the Theory of Knowledge. 
State University of New York Press, Albany, USA, 1977. 
[HC95J Guillermo R Simari y Carlos 1. Chesñevar. Arguments and contexts. En XXI Conferencia 
Latinoamericana de Informática, CLEI/PANEL 95, Canela (Brasil)., Julio 1995. 
[SCG94J Guillermo R Sirnari, Carlos l. Chesñevar, y Alejandro J. Garda. The role of dialectics in de-
feasible argumentation. En Anales de la XIV Conferencia Internacional de la Sociedad Chilena 
para Ciencias de la Computación, Universidad de Concepción, Concepción (Chile), Noviembre 
1994. 
18G951 Guillermo R Simari y Alejandro J. GarcÍa. A knowledge representation language for defeasi-
ble argumentation. En XXI Conferencia Latinoamericana de Informática, CLEI/PANEL 95, 
Canela (Brasil)., Julio 1995. 
[8L92] Guillermo R. Simari y Ronald P. Loui. A Mathematical Treatment of Defeasible Reasoning 
and its Implementation. Artificial Intelligence, 53:125-157, 1992. 
¡Vre93)' Gerard A.W. Vreeswijk. Studies in DefeaBible Argumentation. Tesis Ph.D., Vrije University, 
Amsterdam (Holanda), 1993. 
[Vre95J Gerard A.W. Vreeswijk. Ilepresentation of Formal Dispute with a Standing Order. Reporte 
Técnico, Department of Computer Science, Rijksuniversiteit Limburg, Maastrich, The Nether-
land..~., 1995. 
628 
3er .. Worlcshop sobre Aspectos Teóricos de la Inteligencia Artificial 
